

Message Text

SECRET

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41

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W
----- 069888

P 271115Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6457

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 8233

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, IN

SUBJECT: MIDLINK 74 OR THE NEW ARMADA

REF: STATE 186620

1. I AM DISTURBED BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN'S 10744 ON PROGRAMMED CENTO EXERCISE MIDLINK AND AM GREATFUL DEPARTMENT SENT US A COPY. ALTHOUGH MOYNIHAN DOES NOT SAY SO, HE SEEMS TO IMPLY WE SHOULD CANCEL, POSTPONE, OR CURTAIL THIS CENTO EXERCISE OR AT LEAST THE U.S. PORTION THEREOF. THIS, I STRONGLY BELIEVE, IS NOT IN THE BEST OVERALL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE REFERENCED MESSAGE MAKES NOTE OF THE FACT THAT MIDLINK 74 IS A CENTO EXERCISE, BUT THEN SEEMS TO PROCEED AS IF IT WERE A U.S. SHOW. IT SEEMS TO ME RECORD WOULD SHOW THAT THERE IS NOTHING SUDDEN, OR MACHIAVELLIAN, OR ANTI-INDIAN ABOUT THE PROPOSED EXERCISE. ONE CHANGE FROM WHAT HAS NOW BECOME KNOWN AS A ROUTINE ANNUAL EXERCISE WOULD APPEAR TO BE THAT CENTO MEMBER NATIONS HAVE UPPED THEIR PARTICIPATION AS FAR AS SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT ARE CONCERNED. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FIRST TO OFFER GREATER PARTICIPATION WAS THE BRITISH AND THAT WE FOLLOWED SUIT.

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IRANIAN PARTICIPATION IS ALSO UP AS THEIR CAPABILITIES

HAVE INCREASED. ANOTHER CHANGE, AND ONE WE SHOULD VIEW WITH FAVOR, IS THAT PAKISTAN IS AFTER MANY YEARS AN ACTIVE AND SIGNIFICANT PARTICIPANT IN CENTO EXERCISES.

3. I WAS ASSURED BY A BRIEFING TEAM THAT CAME THROUGH HERE SOME WEEKS AGO THAT PRECAUTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN AS FAR AS INDIA WAS CONCERNED. MOVEMENT OF SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT ARE TO BE KEPT WELL AWAY FROM THE INDIAN COASTLINE IN AN AREA SOUTHWEST OF KARACHI. ALSO, THE BRITISH PLAN TO MAKE POST CALLS IN INDIA WITH THEIR SHIPS AFTER THE EXERCISE IS OVER AND CARRY OUT JOINT EXERCISES WITH INDIAN NAVY. I RECOGNIZE MOYNIHAN HAS HIGH HOPES FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO INDIA AND HAS DEVOTED A LOT OF HARD WORK TO MAKING SURE THAT IT HELPS FURTHER OUR LONGTERM GOAL OF ESTABLISHING MORE MATURE RELATIONS WITH THE GOI. I HOPE THAT WHEN HE HAS BEEN FURTHER BRIEFED ABOUT MIDLINK HE WILL COME TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE EXERCISE SHOULD NOT ENDANGER ANY OF THE GOOD THINGS WHICH IT IS HOPED MAY RESULT FROM THE VISIT. TO CONCLUDE OTHERWISE, AS HE SEEMS TO IMPLY IN PARA 2A OF HIS MESSAGE, IS TO ASSUME THAT THE INDIANS WILL ONLY BE SATISFIED WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH PAKISTAN IS NOT ONLY DEPRIVED OF THE WHEREWITHAL TO DEFEND HERSELF BUT IS ALSO KEPT FROM EVEN THE MOST ROUTINE ASSOCIATION WITH THE STRONGER POWERS WITH WHOM SHE IS ALLIED. (AND IF INDIANS SHOW SENSITIVITY AS REGARDS PARA 2C, IT MIGHT BE AGAINST BACKGROUND OF THEIR OWN ATTACK ON A RELATIVELY DEFENSELESS KARACHI A FEW YEARS BACK.) I DON'T THINK AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN BELIEVES THAT SUCH A SITUATION CAN BE THE BASIS FOR THE STABILITY AND DETENTE IN SOUTH ASIA TO WHICH I KNOW HE IS ATTACHED.

4. HAVING SAID ALL THE ABOVE I DOUBT THE INDIANS WOULD BE ALL THIS CONCERNED OVER THIS EXERCISE. THEY WILL KNOW THAT THIS IS AN ANNUAL AFFAIR - AND THEY ALSO HAVE SEEN CENTO REFUSE TO COME TO THE AID OF PEKIS JJ IN TWO WARS WITHIN A DECADE. I WOULD ALSO VENTURE TO SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ALSO SEE THIS FOR EXACTLY WHAT IT IS, I.E., ANOTHER ROUTINE EVENT WHICH THEY GOT USED TO LONG AGO.

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5. I KNOW THAT AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN IS CONCERNED ABOUT DIEGO GARCIA AND HAS DEVOTED A LOT OF TIME AND ENERGY TO THE MATTER. BUT FOR THE LIFE OF ME, I CANNOT UNDERSTAND HOW THAT SMALL MISERABLE ATOLL GETS INVOLVED IN A MESSAGE ABOUT FIVE-POWER CENTO NAVAL MANEUVERS OFF KARACHI. THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THINK PIECES ON THIS SUBJECT AMUSED ME EARLY THIS SUMMER WHEN

FOR TWO MONTHS THE DIEGO TRAFFIC ENGAGED MUCH OF OUR CODE ROOM TALENT. IT DID RESULT IN SOME INTERESTED READING, BUT IT ALSO CONTAINED A DEFINITE MARGIN OF PURE POPPYCOCK. IT SEEMED RATHER INCREDIBLE TO ME THAT IN A GOODLY PORTION OF THE WORLD WE WERE CHASING AROUND AT HIGH LEVEL TRYING TO EXPLAIN FUTURE PLANS OF OUR NAVY, EVEN IN PLACES WHERE THEY WOULD RATHER WE WOULD NOT TALK ABOUT IT. AT THIS POST I ASKED A SECOND SECRETARY TO HANDLE THE MATTER ON COMPLYING WITH OUR INSTRUCTIONS AT A LEVEL JUST BELOW THE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE. NO PROBLEM. THERE WON'T BE ANY PROBLEM HERE UNLESS SHOMEHOW OR OTHER WE MANAGE TO DEVISE A SCHEME OF CONTINUED CONTROVERSY AND PUBLICITY OVER THIS MATTER. WE WOULD THEN BE IN AN ATMOSPHERE WHERE POLITICIANS MIGHT FEEL THERE WAS AN ISSUE ON WHICH THEY COULD MAKE POLITICAL CAPITAL.

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W
----- 070312

P 271115Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6458

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AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 8233

EXDIS

6. AS I MENTIONED ABOVE, REFTTEL SEEMS TO SUGGEST SOMETHING COULD OR SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT MIDLINK. I CAN'T AGREE. I BELIEVE THAT ANY MOVE TO CANCEL OR POSTPONE IT OR TO REDUCE ITS SCOPE AT THE ADVANCED STAGE ITS PLANNING HAS NOW RACHED WOULD INVOLVE SERIOUS POLITICAL COSTS FAR EXCEEDING ANY BRIEF FLUTTER OF FAVOR THIS MIGHT WIN FOR US IN INDIA. I'M SURE THAT MY COLLEAGUES IN ANKARA AND TEHRAN, WHO WOULD BE AS HARD

PUT AS I TO EXPLAIN OUR DECISION TO THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS, WILL AGREE THAT THESE LOSSES WOULD NOT BE CONFINED TO PAKISTAN.

7. I KNOW THA THERE'S ALWAYS A NATURAL BUREAUCRAOFC TENDENCY TO TRY TO FIND SOME SUPPOSEDLY ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE TO ACCOMMODATE DIFFERENT INTERESTS, AND I CAN SEE SOMEBODY BACK IN WASHINGTON SUGGESTING THAT EVERYBODY CAN BE KEPT REASONABLY HAPPY IF WE PULL OUT THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER, OR A SUBMARINE, OR WHAT HAVE YOU. LET'S NOT GO DOWN THAT ROAD. IT WOULD BE HARD TO EXPLAIN AT THIS STAGE IN THE CENTO COUNTRIES AND DO NEXT TO NOTHING FOR US WITH THE INDIANS. IF THEY SHOULD INSIST ON BEING TROUBLED BY MIDLINK IT WILL BE BECAUSE THEY SEE THE EXERCISE AS AN INDICATION OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN RATHER THAN FOR CENTO WHICH, IN FACT, IT IS. THE
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NUMBER OF SHIPS AND PLANES WE PUT IN WILL NOT BE ALL THAT IMPORTANT FOR THEM.

8. IN DRAFTING MUCH OF THE ABOVE, I HAVE TRIED TO LOOK AT THINGS PRIMARILY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OS SOMEONE CONCERNED ABOUT HE IMPACT OF INDIAN AND SOVIET REACTION TO MIDLINK ON U.S. GOALS IN SOUTH ASIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN. AFTER ALL, THESE ARE THE TERMS IN WHICH MOYNIHAN'S MESSAGE IS PHRASED. I ALSO HAVE HAD TO ADD CONSIEWRATION OF OUR POSITION IN THE CENTO AREA. LET ME CLOSE WITH A FEW WORDS IN MY ROLE AS AMBASSADOR TO PAKISTAN.

9. IN MY NINE MONTHS HERE I FIND THAT WE REALLY HAVE NO MAJOR PROBLEMS IN OUR LIBATERAL RELATIONS EXCEPT THAT OF SECURITY. I MADE AN EXTENSIVE STUDY AS TO WHERE THINGS STOOD BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND ITS NEIGHBORS ON QUESTIONS OF MILITARY SUPPLY AND MILITARY LEVELS. ALL OF THIS WAS RELAYED ON TO WASHINGTON AND THE CONCLUSIONS SEEMED TO BE AT LEAST TO BE PRETTY OBVIOUS. THERE MAY, OF COURSE, BE LARGER CONSIDERATIONS BUT I BELIEVE ANYONE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH ALL ASPECTS OF OUR PRESENT ARMS SUPPLY POLICY, AND ITS EFFECTS HERE, SHOULD AGREE THAT THIS POLICY HAS BECOME, UNDER ALL CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, DISCRIMINATORY AND UNFAIR AND REQUIRES CHANGE. OUR PROBLEM HERE HAS BEEN GREATLY INTENSIFIED BY INDIA GOING NUCLEAR. IF WE CONTINUE TO DELAY OUR LONG-AWAITED DECISION TO MOVE TOWARD REVISION IN OUR ARMS SUPPLY POLICY, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME TAKING THE ANOMALOUS STEP OF INTERFERING WITH A PAK-HOSTED FULLY PLANNED CENTO EXERCISE OFF PAKISTAN'S OWN SHORES, U.S. RELATIONS WITH THIS COUNTRY CAN BE EXPECTED TO TAKE A DEFINITE CHANGE FOR THE WORSE.BYROADE

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